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In highly urbanised regions worldwide congestion is
a severe and increasing problem.Mainly due to pop-
ulation and income growth car ownership levels
increase, whereas the extension of the road network
capacity increases less rapidly because of high costs,
environmental concerns or space limitations.As ear-
ly as 1920 it was recognised that if demand for infra-
structure capacity exceeds supply (and increasing ca-
pacity is not an option) road pricing increases the
general welfare (Pigou 1920). Additional benefits
from pricing could be environmental and safety ben-
efits (e.g.,Verhoef et al. 2008).
For a few decades pricing has frequently been the
subject of academic research and policy debates in
many countries. However, despite the benefits shown
in academic literature,only few examples of real world
implementation of any form of road pricing exist.
These include private companies that own roads im-
pose tolls,for example in France and Portugal,and spe-
cific pricing in some urban regions, such as London
City,Stockholm,a few Norwegian cities and Singapore.
Germany has also introduced a system of road charges
for lorries using motorways (the Maut system).
In the Netherlands the idea of introducing a form of
road pricing has been discussed now for over two
decades. The current Dutch government announced
the introduction of a per kilometre road charge, re-
placing the current taxes on new road vehicles and
yearly taxes. At the time of writing the first draft of
this paper (February 2010) the introduction of this
form of road pricing was closer to implementation
than any form of road pricing that has been proposed
since 1988. However, on 20 February 2010 the gov-
ernment collapsed. On 18 March 2010 the Christian
Democrats announced that they would no longer sup-
port the plan. At the time of finalizing this paper
(April 2010) it is very uncertain whether the plan will
be implemented. Much depends on the coming elec-
tions (June) and the coalition that will follow.
This paper aims to give an overview of the current
Dutch policy plans, their effects and the preceding dis-
cussions in order to learn lessons for future policy de-
velopments in this area. Although the system includes
most road vehicles, not only cars, the emphasis of this
paper will be on cars, firstly because these outnumber
other road vehicle categories by far, and secondly be-
cause cars are the most discussed road vehicle category.
A brief overview of the history of transport pricing
in the Netherlands
This paper starts with 1988, the year in which the pro-
posal for the so-called Second Transport Structure
Plan (Dutch abbreviation: SVVII) was launched. In
1990 the official governmental decision on that plan
(an updated version) was taken.The plan presented a
forecast for the period 1986–2010 showing that an
increase in car use of 70 percent was expected. This
increase was considered to be undesirable because it
would lead to congestion and environmental impacts.
The policy target was a (maximum) growth in car use
of 35 percent. Many policy measures were suggested
that would reduce the expected growth, ranging from
land-use policies and improving public transport, to
road pricing. The most effective measure by far was
thought to be the introduction of road pricing on
Dutch motorways, with prices varying by time and
place. Due to a lack of support in society and – and
closely related to that – a mainly negative press, the
policy was abandoned and replaced by proposals for
(1) a toll system, (2) a rush hour permit, and (3) road
pricing again. None of these proposals were imple-
mented due to a lack of support from society. The
Dutch motorists union,ANWB, which was against the
proposals, played an important role in influencing
opposition from society.
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The former Dutch minister of transport, Karla Peijs,
realised soon after she became minister that without
any form of road pricing congestion would increase
severely. And she also realised that without wide
support from society any new attempt to introduce a
road pricing system was doomed to fail. She made a
very important decision. She asked the (then) for-
mer director of the ANWB, Paul Nouwen, to chair a
committee that would investigate the idea of paying
for car use and car ownership in the future.The offi-
cial name of the committee was Paying Differently
for Mobility (in Dutch:Anders Betalen voor Mobili-
teit).This time it was not the ministry that first devel-
oped a plan quite autonomously, but the representa-
tives of important organisations. Committee mem-
bers included the ANWB, Natuur en Milieu (the most
important Dutch environmental organisation),the em-
ployers organisation,the employees organisation,three
ministries (transport, the environment and finance),
the union of car importing companies, the union of
garage managers,organisations of good transport com-
panies and others.
The committee reported in 2005 and advised the gov-
ernment to transform the current vehicle-ownership-
based taxes (new vehicles, yearly taxes) to a per kilo-
metre charge. This charge could vary according to
place and time, and the environmental characteristics
of vehicles. The reactions of politicians and press to
the report were less negative than to previous pro-
posals,and in many cases quite positive.The new gov-
ernment that was established in 2007 announced in
their coalition agreement that they would introduce
the per kilometre charge before the end of their four-
year governing period.
Current situation
This section describes the situation in March 2010.
Announcing the plans to introduce a tax is one thing,
implementing it is another. After two years it
became clear that introducing the first stage of the
system before the change of governments was not
possible. Many decisions had to be made and many
policy options were discussed, focusing on tariffs, via
hard- and software to tendering procedures.The mi-
nister announced that he would set “a first step after
which no return will be possible”. What that meant
was not clear at the time.In November 2009 the cur-
rent Dutch minister had presented his bill. Key ele-
ments of the proposal were:
• The yearly tax and tax per kilometre will be con-
verted to a per kilometre tax, starting with lorries
(2012), to be followed by cars the year after.
• The implementation will be gradual, not only by
vehicle type (lorries first, followed by cars and
other road vehicles), but also by gradually reduc-
ing fixed taxes and charging per kilometre. The
idea is to avoid shocks in governmental income
and huge disturbances in the vehicle markets.
• The system includes all roads, not only motorways.
• The system includes most, but not all road vehi-
cles. Motor bikes and pre 1987 vehicles will be
excluded.
• Total yearly income for the government should be
as high as what would have been the case without
the introduction of the new pricing system.
• The costs of the hard- and software need to be
paid by the vehicle owner, to a maximum of five
percent of the costs of revenues.
• The revenues will be earmarked for infrastructure
costs.
• A basic fee of 6.7 ct/km for cars will be (gradual-
ly) introduced. In addition a CO2-emissions-de-
pendent car charge will be added, as will a charge
based on time and place.
• The differentiation of charges by time and place
will be implemented gradually, starting with re-
gional experiments.
The bill received a lot of media attention and gener-
ated a lot of policy and non-policy related discus-
sions – see below.
Although it received hardly any attention in the
debate, an important characteristic of the system as
proposed is flexibility: many changes can be made
over time, varying from differentiations by time and
place, CO2 emissions, but possibly also by safety
related factors,and harmful pollutants.In case of the
introduction of electrical vehicles, charges to com-
pensate for a loss in government income resulting
from levies on fuel, will also be possible.
An overview of relevant research
The Netherlands has a tradition of doing a lot of pol-
icy-related research in the area of transport (and in
other policy areas such as the environment,the econ-
omy and land use).Also for the development of pric-
ing-related policy plans a lot of research has been
carried out.Before the discussion that resulted in the
establishment of the Platform Paying Differently forMobility took place,the former minister of transport
asked for an overview of literature on road pricing
(resulting in Verhoef et al. 2004). Some of the con-
clusions of that report are listed below.
• Road pricing can reduce congestion effectively.
• Road pricing can increase the general welfare if
the system costs are not too high.
• Acceptance can be problematic. It can increase if
(1) differentiation is relatively great so that peo-
ple can select cheap alternatives;(2) a lot of atten-
tion is paid to the travellers’ point of view;(3) rev-
enues are used to compensate for negative effects
(e.g., reduced fixed taxes on cars, increasing road
capacity), or – in case of lowering income taxes –
if low income groups benefit most.
• Business travel is less price sensitive, followed by
commuting.Car use for social and recreational pur-
poses is most price sensitive.
• Road pricing cannot only reduce congestion but
also overall car use. The reduction of congestion
increases the reduction of car use, firstly because
a 1 percent increase in car use results in more than
1 percent increase of congestion, and secondly
pricing can be time and place specific, with rela-
tively high levies on congested road segments in
rush hour periods.
• Road pricing can result in many behavioural
responses, including mode switch (to car pooling,
train, bus, tram, metro, bicycle), change in time of
day (in case of time specific charges), reducing
travel frequency (e.g.,work at home for one day a
week), change in residential location, change of
destination (e.g., work location).
• The devil is in the details: pricing is not necessar-
ily always “good” (from perspective of the gener-
al welfare).It is very important to design a “good”
policy.There are several second best options that
could perform relatively well if the theoretical
first best option is not an option (e.g., because of
a lack of political support).
Directly related to the platform and discussions that
followed,several research reports were published,all
in Dutch. First research was carried out to support
the development of the proposal of the Platform
Paying Differently for Mobility. Secondly, a project
called Joint Facts Finding was carried out, resulting
in a research report. Thirdly two cost-benefit analy-
ses (CBA) were carried out, and fourth, a study into
the effects of several levels of converting the tax on
new cars into a kilometre based taxes were carried
out. The study of Join Facts Finding was used as in-
put for both CBAs and the latter study. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to describe all the studies and
their alternatives. Below some key results are pre-
sented, mainly based on the second CBA (Ecorys
2007) and the study into effects of several levels of
converting the tax on new cars into a kilometre based
taxes (Besseling et al. 2008).
• Converting the yearly tax on cars to a per kilo-
metre charge that varies by time and place, and
CO2 emissions has significant positive effects on
congestion, safety and emissions.
• In addition converting the purchase tax to a per
kilometre tax results in additional benefits (safe-
ty,environment,less congestion),but also in addi-
tional costs.The balance could be roughly zero to
negative (up to minus 20 percent of the balance
that results from converting the yearly tax only).
The results presented below assume converting
both yearly taxes and purchase taxes, and are for
the year 2020.
• From an overall welfare perspective the pros are
much stronger than the cons. Important benefits
include a decrease in congestion (and so a reduc-
tion in travel times), more reliable travel times,
fewer accidents and lower emissions. Negative ef-
fects include a loss of welfare due to a reduction
in overall travel, mode change and change in the
time of day of travel,less government income due
to levies on fuel (as a result of a reduction in fuel
use,mainly due to a reduction in car use) and sys-
tem costs.
• The positive welfare effect (benefits minus costs)
can be as high as more than EUR one billion per
year (base year of calculations: 2020).
• More people gain than lose. This because more
than 50 percent of people’s car use levels are
below the break even point.
• Reductions in congestion (positive effect) minus
losses in welfare due to changing travel behav-
iour) can be as large as roughly EUR 800 million
to one billion per year. Business travel benefits a
lot (slightly over EUR one billion), households
lose: gains of travel time reductions do not fully
compensate for losses due to changes in travel
behaviour (total effect: up to EUR 300–400 mil-
lion per year).
• Car use decreases by about 15 percent, emissions
decrease also by about 15 percent.
• Car ownership might increase by two percent in
2020 (and up to five  percent in 2030).
• Fuel efficiency of the car fleet is hardly affected by
the pricing system. Efficiency increasing effects of
prices are dependent on per kilometre CO2 emis-
sions and the increase in car ownership resulting in
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the purchase of relatively fuel-efficient cars com-
pensate for the efficiency decreasing effect of
removing purchase taxes and yearly taxes that
(directly or indirectly) increase greatly depending
on per kilometre CO2 emissions.
• Safety benefits are in the order of magnitude of
EUR 500 million per year, environmental bene-
fits up to EUR 300–400 million per year.
• Decreases in government incomes of levies on
fuel can be up to EUR 850 million per year.
• System costs are roughly EUR 500 million per year.
In addition to these conclusions a few more reflections
on the results are important. Firstly, it should be noted
that system costs are relatively uncertain. On the one
hand many ICT projects have (sometimes huge) cost
overruns.A Google search on “cost overruns”(or “cost
escalations”) and ICT, provides many examples. On
the other hand,due to efficiencies of scale and learning
effects, many innovations have decreasing unit prices
over time. At the time of writing several countries
including the UK, Germany, and Belgium, are dis-
cussing, at least informally, the introduction of a per
kilometre tax, depending on the Dutch experience. If
several other countries were to introduce such a tax,
system costs could decrease over time. A second con-
sideration relates to the adequacy of the models used
for the forecasts.Geurs and van Wee (2010) analyse the
models used and conclude the direction of the effects is
plausible, but the results are probably upper bound.
Especially the reduction in car use might be upper
bound, mainly because car ownership increase might
be underestimated, but also because of characteristics
of the model to forecast travel behaviour,a state of the
art tour-based model. They estimate the reduction in
car use to be in the order of magnitude of -5 to -15 per-
cent.The break even point from a welfare perspective
is around -five percent reduction in car use.As a result,
the system would result in welfare losses only if the
reduction in car use is highly overestimated and/or
huge system cost overruns occur.
Support
The previous minister of transport realized that
without support from important actors and society it
would be impossible to implement an innovative
form of road pricing, at least in a country like the
Netherlands with a tradition of discussing and accept-
ing policies while involving a lot of related actors.This
in itself is an important lesson. In addition, enough
support will be crucial for real world implementa-
tion. In my opinion the question whether the policy
will really be implemented remains uncertain until
the day of implementation, and even thereafter. But
if no serious system failures occur, it is likely that
support will increase after implementation. This, for
example, happened in Norwegian cities, where after
the introduction of the toll system support rapidly
increased (Tretvik 2003).I speculate that an inherent
resistance to change plays a role in a lack of support,
at least from the public. In the Netherlands “fair-
ness” is an important argument for opponents of the
system. They give examples of low-income people
that have no other options than driving at rush hours
on expensive road segments.These people are worse
off after the introduction of the new system.This, of
course, is true: there will be winners and losers, and
certainly there will be losers that one might not want
to be losers. But suppose we had the new system in
the past decades, and the proposal was made to
change the system of a per kilometre charge to fixed
taxes on cars (the current system).Then a lot of peo-
ple would consider this highly unfair. E.g., a low-in-
come pensioner driving her car for 1,000 km per year
would have to pay as much as a high-income person
owning the same car, driving it for 50,000 km a year.
I hypothesise that again fairness would be a strong
argument against change.
The important role of support is illustrated by an
event in early 2010.The ANWB was a member of the
platform (see above) that developed the new policy.
But many members might be against it. This placed
the board of the ANWB in a difficult position.There-
fore they organised an internet-based questionnaire
to find out how members (and non-members) think
about the policy, and under which circumstances they
would (not) support the system. The questionnaire
showed that about two third of the respondents sup-
port the idea of changing fixed taxes to a per kilome-
ter tax. However, differentiation by place and time
gained little support, and respondents are doubtful
about the capabilities of the ministries to be able to
handle such a complex system well. Related to the
ANWB survey, the Dutch minister of transport an-
nounced that if the ANWB no longer supported the
new system, he would abandon the policy. A lot of
protest was raised, also by the ANWB which did 
not want this role or the responsibility. The minister
weakened his statement arguing that he wanted to
emphasise the importance of support.
Will the policy be implemented? This is quite uncer-
tain. As already mentioned above on 20 February2010 the Dutch government collapsed. New elec-
tions could result in coalitions that do not support
the system. On the other hand, most political parties
wrote in their election program that changes with re-
spect to pricing in transport should be made, gener-
ally not specifying which changes.A coalition of par-
ties supporting changes in pricing in transport could
receive a majority in parliament. But even in case of
such a coalition,it will remain uncertain until the day
of (successful) implementation, or even thereafter.
Lessons to be learned
Some of the lessons to be learned from the Dutch
experience are listed below.
1. Although the Netherlands announced road pric-
ing more than two decades ago,it has not yet been
introduced, whereas the UK, Sweden, Norway and
Germany all implemented a form of road pricing.
The lack of support is the main reason for not
implementing policy plans.
2. A major shift in policy making was made by the
previous minister of transport who asked a com-
mittee (“platform”) comprised of many organisa-
tions to develop a proposal for pricing in trans-
port, chaired by an important opponent of previ-
ous road pricing systems, the former head of the
motorists union. It was not the ministry who first
developed a plan and then sought to gain support.
3. From a broad welfare perspective the benefits of
road pricing in general can be (much) higher than
the costs. This also applies to the current policy
plan to transform the fixed vehicle taxes to a per
kilometre tax. Benefits include reduced conges-
tion levels, a reduction of accidents and less envi-
ronmental pressure. In addition the new system
will increase fairness: paying varies with vehicle
use. Costs include system costs, reduced revenues
of levies on fuels and welfare losses due to
changes in travel behaviour.
4. It is uncertain if the system will actually be imple-
mented.After (successful) implementation of road
pricing, support may increase.
5. The Dutch system is a modern system using GPS,
charging for all kilometres (not on motorways or
a specific area only) and prices are based on time,
location, and CO2 emissions.
6. The characteristics of the system make changes in
the future quite possible, such as including safety
or harmful emissions in the tariffs.
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